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BLANKET MUSIC LICENSING AND LOCAL
TELEVISION:
AN HISTORICAL ACCIDENT IN NEED OF REFORM
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The copyright laws of the United States confer upon the holder of a
musical composition copyright a number of exclusive prerogatives, including
the right to perform the work publicly.' In the early 1900's, as performances
of copyrighted music by nightclubs, taverns, hotels, and radio broadcasters
became increasingly numerous, scattered, and widespread throughout the
country, it became evident, as the Supreme Court has noted, that this legal
right was not "self-enforcing. ' 2 In 1914, the first performing rights organ-
ization-the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP)-was formed to deal with the problems of locating establishments
performing copyrighted musical works, securing payments for composers
and music publishers whose works were being performed and prosecuting
as infringers those entities which failed to obtain copyright licenses.
This "milieu" in which ASCAP (and thereafter, in 1939, Broadcast
Music Inc. (BMI)) emerged3 dictated creation of an unusual licensing tech-
* Mr. Boucher is a United States Representative from the State of Virginia. A Member
of the Judiciary Committee, he has patroned legislation to alter the means by which television
stations acquire broadcast rights in the music contained in the soundtracks of syndicated
programs
1. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982), and its predecessor provision,
§ l(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909, which provided exclusive rights in public performance
for profit (a distinction which is not material here). The right of public performance was first
adopted in the Copyright Act of 1897, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
2. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979).
The Supreme Court in BAi v. CBS remanded the Second Circuit's first decision in Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. See
CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977) reversing, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The Second Circuit's opinion after remand is reported at 620 F.2d 930 (1980) [hereinafter CBS
Remand], cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1980).
3. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 20.
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nique, which would accomplish several objectives: (i) permit users rapid
access to a large body of copyrighted material; (ii) avoid the cost and delay
of individual negotiations over specific copyrighted works; and (iii) ensure
the copyright owners reasonable payment for exploitation of their works.
What emerged is a form of license called the blanket license, at once a
brilliant solution to a thorny problem and, as experience has shown, a
potent tool of monopoly.
This duality of the blanket license-its useful role in effectuating the
copyright law in certain contexts and its creation of vast monopoly power
for copyright owners subjecting it to possible misapplication-permeates
more than seventy years of experience with this marketing device. Rarely has
commercial practice been so persistently attacked, by both the Government 4
and private sector "customers ' 5 alike, and yet survived so intact. The issue
which bears closer analysis is whether the historical tolerance for blanket
licensing in certain settings has improperly insulated that licensing technique
from condemnation in other, far less compelling circumstances.
A. The Blanket License, Copyright and Competition Policy
As a premise of their operations, ASCAP and BMI have obtained from
their participating copyright proprietors the right to determine the types of
licenses to be conferred on users and the prices at which such licenses will
be offered.6 From this sweeping grant of rights, ASCAP and BMI have
4. ASCAP and its blanket license were investigated by the Department of Justice as
early as 1926. See Cohn, Music Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GEO. L.J. 407,
424 n. 91 (1941). A later Government investigation culminated in the filing of an antitrust
complaint against ASCAP in 1934, a case which ultimately was discontinued after trial had
commenced. See Complaint for Plaintiff, United States v. American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, E 78-388 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). In 1941, the United States charged that
the ASCAP blanket license was an illegal restraint of trade and that arbitrary prices were
being charged as the result of an illegal copyright pool. See Complaint at pp. 3-4, United
States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civ. No. 13-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1941). That case ultimately was settled by a consent decree which placed various restrictions
on ASCAP's licensing procedures. United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). This decree was reopened
and extensively amended in 1950, following numerous complaints by television licensees and
successful litigation against ASCAP by movie theatre exhibitors (see Section V, infra). United
States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
5. See, e.g., BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 5 (television networks); Buffalo Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985) (local television stations); K-91, Inc. v. Gerslwin Pub.
Corp. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) (radio); Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981), aff'd mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir.
1982) (general licensees).
6. ASCAP currently licenses, on a non-exclusive basis, the small (non-dramatic) per-
forming rights in some three million compositions, and has more than 30,000 composer and
music publisher members. BMI has approximately 80,000 composer and music publisher
affiliates, and licenses the small performing rights in some one million compositions. A third,
considerably smaller licensing organization, SESAC, operates in similar fashion to ASCAP
1158
BLANKET MUSIC LICENSING
offered only performing rights licenses covering the entirety of the works
in the organizations' repertoires to users of musical compositions. No other
forms of licenses have ever been offered.7 These so-called "blanket" licenses
permit a user to perform any or all of the licensed music for the duration
of the license. Significantly, blanket license fees always have been set by
ASCAP and BMI on a basis such that the actual amount and type of music
used by the licensee will have no bearing on the fee. Instead, fees have
been based either on a stipulated annual fee applied to specified categories
of users8 or on a formula keyed to the user's revenues derived from the
business for which the performance license is required. 9
It can be readily observed that the blanket license, by setting a single
fee for access to millions of works of different creators, eliminates price
competition among copyright holders over the value of their individual
works' ° and falls to further the notion of the copyright law that individual
works should compete, and be rewarded, on their own merits. The blanket
license, as the Department of Justice has observed, reflects "substantial
deviations from the competitive norm . . . "I' through, inter alia, insulating
copyright owners from price competition and permitting ASCAP and BMI
to price their "product" in a manner reflecting not its market value, but
the ability of users to pay.
This deviation from antitrust and copyright norms would appear to be
tolerable to the extent that it enables a market for spontaneous performances
of copyrighted music fruitfully to exist or, in the words of the Supreme
Court, "to effectuate.., the commerce anticipated by the Copyright Act."'
12
But what about the circumstances where such "market-making" conditions
do not exist? It would seem that in such contexts the burden should rest
with those benefiting from the license to justify its application.
In the nearly 100 years since enactment of the Sherman Act, it has been
and BMI. See Buffalo Broadcasting, 744 F.2d at 920; BMI Annual Report for the year ended
June 20, 1986, p. 1.
7. Under their respective consent decrees, the performing rights organizations technically
have been required to offer a variant of the blanket license known as a per program license.
Under this license form-in reality a "mini-blanket license"-the licensee still purchases access
to the organization's entire repertoire. License payments, though, are based not on total
programming revenues, but on revenues related to a specific program or "programming
period." While technically available, the per program license rarely has been utilized as the
rates at which it historically has been offered have made its use economically infeasible for
almost all broadcaster licensees.
8. The television networks serve as an example of this type of user.
9. The blanket license fee for a local television station is predicated on the station's
revenues.
10. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 32 (1979)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. American Society of Com-
posers, Authors, and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 935 (2nd Cir. 1980).
11. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, American Broadcasting Systems, Inc.
v. American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2nd Cir. 1980).
(No. 75-7600 (November 5, 1979) at 16).
12. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 19.
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a fundamental premise of our economy that "the unrestrained interaction
of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress."' 3
It has long been recognized that copyright owners are not immune from
these basic tenets: "[Tihe copyright laws confer no rights on copyright
owners to fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust
laws .... ",14 Indeed, our system of copyright protection envisions but a
limited grant of monopoly power to copyright owners. The underlying
rationale is that such a grant is
[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the
benefit of the public .... Not that any particular class of citizens,
however worthy, may benefit, but because the policy is believed to
be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will
stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus to authors and
inventors. 15
While our copyright law seeks to promote creativity by granting limited
protection to creators,.it also seeks to assure that this "[p]rotection should
not go substantially beyond the purposes of protection.' 1 6 Our copyright
law, in short, requires a careful balancing of the needs of creators, users
and the general public. It was not meant to "impose a burden on the public
substantially greater than the benefit [it] give[s] to authors." 1 7 In the effort
to benefit the public by stimulating creative works, it was intended to ensure
that authors retain the exclusive right to exploit their works without fear
of infringement-and nothing more. Where a licensing practice created to
effectuate copyright principles goes beyond bestowing such a benefit on
copyright proprietors, it upsets the balance contemplated by the Act.
These precepts apply with no less force to the specific circumstances of
those holding copyright interests in musical compositions. As the Congress
wrote in conjunction with enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act:
The main objective to be desired in expanding copyright pro-
tection accorded to music has been to give to the composer an
adequate return for the value of his composition, and it has been
a serious and a difficult task to combine the protection of the
composer with the protection of the public, and to so frame an act
that it would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the
composer an adequate return for all use made of his composition
and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monop-
13. Northern Pacific Rye Co. v. Unites States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
14. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 19.
15. H.R. RP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
16. Chaffee, Reflection on the Law of Copyright, 45 CoLuM. L. REv. 502, 505-506
(1945). See also, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information, United
States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1986) at 286.
17. Chaffee, supra note 16, at 507.
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olies, which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the
composer for the purpose of protecting his interests. 8
B. The Blanket License and Its Application To Local Television
The circumstances of local television broadcasters pose a stark example
of a user group which has been remitted to living with the blanket license
in circumstances where it is not a market necessity and where its application
creates a distortion of the market for music performing rights.
The blanket license arose, and historically has been justified, in those
market circumstances in which users have required spontaneous access to a
large repertoire of music, without the delay involved in engaging in prior
individual negotiations with copyright owners. 9 Its application is not jus-
tified in those circumstances when music uses can be and are planned in
advance and when a mechanism exists whereby individual copyright owners
can negotiate with the entity selecting the music involved. The presence of
the blanket license in these circumstances is not only unnecessary to make
the market function, it actually inhibits free market transactions.
The experience of the theatre exhibitors in the 1930's and 1940's, and
the more recent experience of the local television broadcasters, confirms
that the blanket license in these latter circumstances supplants normal market
mechanisms, is aberrational, and is not justified as a matter of sound
antitrust, economic, or copyright doctrine. Ironically, the burden has been
shifted to broadcasters to demonstrate why they should not be saddled with
a licensing device which is not appropriate to their circumstances, yet from
the grasp of which they cannot, through self-help, escape.
Given this state of affairs, legislation to require source licensing0 offers
the only prospect of restoring the proper functioning of copyright and free
market principles to the licensing of music performing rights for local
television.
II. OIGIs OF THE BLANKET LICENSE
The fundamental basis or justification for the formation of the per-
forming rights organizations, ASCAP and BMI, extends from the goal of
our copyright law "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of science and useful [a]rts
by securing for limited [tlimes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive
18. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909).
19. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 5, 20; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, CBS
v. ASCAP, No. 77-1583 (November 1978) at 21; Garner, U.S. v. ASCAP: The Licensing
Provisions of the Amended Final Judgment of 1950, 23 Bulletin, Copyright Soc. of the U.S.A.
119, 121-122 (1975-76); DeFelice, Buffalo Broadcasting: Expensive Music for Expensive Cus-
tomers, 8 COL. J. oF ART AND LAW 207, 209 (1983).
20. H.R. 1195, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 698, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) would
require program syndicators to acquire and convey music performing rights along with other
rights necessary to the airing of the program.
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[rnight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries." 2' An exclusive right
in the public performance of musical compositions was first recognized in
1897.2 As included in the Copyright Act of 1909,3 this right of authors
and composers was limited to public performances "for profit" (which
term-subsequently eliminated by the 1976 revision of the Act-was broadly
construed to require a performing rights license in those situations where
even indirect commercial benefit to the user was to be expected),2
For this newly granted right to have any value, a method had to be
found by which composers could be compensated for the numerous indirect
or secondary uses25 of their music precipitated by the principal users of
copyrighted music of that era. These "users" were primarily restaurants,
taverns, hotels, and nightclubs (commercial establishments where music was
performed as an incidental sidelight of the business' chief undertaking) and
radio broadcasters.
By 1914, songwriters and publishers realized that, given the fleeting
nature of these users' performances of music occurring spontaneously
throughout the country, the value of their performing rights could be
exploited only by establishing an organization able to deal effectively with
the numerous and widespread "performers" of copyrighted music. 26 As a
result, in 1914 a group of composers organized the first United States
performing rights society, ASCAP, in recognition that
those who performed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous
and widespread, and most performances so fleeting, that as a
practical matter it was impossible for the many individual copyright
owners to negotiate with and license the users and to detect unau-
thorized uses.
27
ASCAP's purpose was two-fold:
to provide a [clearinghouse] through which users of musical works
would be able to obtain licenses to use the copyrighted works of
all of the members on the payment of a single fee without accounting
separately for each work performed; and ... to provide composers
and publishers with a central means through which they could
license performances of their works, and at the same time enable
21. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
22. See 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 (1897).
23. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970) (1909 Copyright Act).
24. See, e.g., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle, 51
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1931); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J.
1923).
25. Secondary uses reflect uses of music. in situations where no admission is charged as
a function of the performance of that music.
26. See Note, Performing Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J. 783, 785
(1978). See also Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest, 19 LAw & CornMr .
PROB. 275, 284 (1954) (citing Dep't of Justice complaint in United States v. ASCAP).
27. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 4-5.
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them to detect any infringements in thousands of places throughout
the country.
28
Thus, ASCAP arose to serve the needs of both copyright proprietors
(who needed a means to monitor and license performance of their works)
and music users (who could not be expected to obtain a license from each
composer for each performance). 29 It sought to accomplish this task through
the vehicle of the "blanket license" format previously described. As the
Supreme Court was to explain:
ASCAP and the blanket license developed together out of the
practical situation in the marketplace.... Most users want[ed]
unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access to any and all of the
repertory of compositions, and the owners want[ed] a reliable
method of collecting for the use of their copyrights .... 10
It was, in short, "market necessity ... [that] justify[ied] ASCAP blanket
licenses for restaurants, night clubs, skating rinks and even radio stations;"'"
and it was "in th[at] milieu. ... that the blanket license arose.
' 32
to establish and maintain, by means of the pooling of their indi-
vidual copyright monopolies, enhanced and non-competitive prices
or royalties for licenses to perform publicly copyrighted musical
compositions owned and controlled by individual defendants; to
eliminate all competition among members of defendant Society in
the sale of licenses to perform publicly their individual musical
compositions and to exercise the power obtained by defendants
through the unlawful pooling of their individual copyright monop-
olies, by concertedly refusing to license the public performance by
radio broadcasting stations and all other persons engaged in the
public performance for profit of copyrighted music of any copy-
III. EARLY CONCERNS ABOUT THE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE BLANKET LICENSE
Even with these understandable roots, at an early date the blanket
28. H. Finkelstein, PUBLIC PERFORmANCH RIGHTS IN MusIc AND PERFORMANCE RIGHTS
SociETms 8 (Rev. Ed. 1961). See also Finkelstein, ASCAP as an Example of the Clearing
House System in Operation, 14 BULL. CR. Soc'y 2, 3 (1966).
29. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1948)
(findings of fact and conclusions of law 20). See also BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 5.
30. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 20.
31. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 140 n. 26.
32. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 20. BMI, the second major performing rights organization
in America, was formed in 1939 by radio broadcasters to serve as an alternative to ASCAP
as a source of music for radio. The formation of BMI reflected a combination of the radio
broadcasters' recognition of their need for instantaneous, "blanket" access to music, and their
disinclination to accede to the blanket license rate hikes proposed by ASCAP at that time.
See Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GEo. L.J. 407 (1941) (discussing
ASCAP-radio industry controversies which led to the formation of BMI); Shull, Collecting
Collectivity: ASCAP's Perennial Dilemma, 7 COPYRIGHT L. Sym'. (ASCAP) 35 (1956) (same).
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license was the subject of significant concern by the Department of Justice
as to its anticompetitive effects and overall anticompetitive potential. After
several false starts33 the Justice Department in 1941 sued both ASCAP and
BMI alleging a variety of antitrust offenses arising from their blanket
licensing practices.3 4 Of central concern was the organizations' practice of
refusing to issue any licenses other than blanket licenses to users at royalty
rates determined by the organizations. The ASCAP complaint specifically
charged ASCAP and its members with an agreement
righted musical composition owned and controlled by a member of
defendant, except on the basis of a general license covering any and
all musical compositions of all members and except upon the basis
of an arbitrary royalty for such general license, fixed and determined
by the .. self-perpetuating board of directors of defendant Soci-
ety. .... 35
The Government's conclusions about the elimination of competition
under the blanket license were indisputable.3 6 As the courts would later hold
in the context of a private lawsuit challenging the blanket license, "[T]here
is no price competition between separate musical compositions .... [U]nder
a blanket license ... [n]o price considerations affect the choice among
songs because the [user] holds a blanket license to perform all songs."
37
Apparently unwilling to challenge the Government in court, ASCAP
promptly moved (within a week of the Government's filing of its complaint)
to work with the Government toward entry of a consent decree to settle
the Government's 1941 lawsuit (the "1941 Decree"). The 1941 Decree sought
primarily to: (i) curb ASCAP's power to compel higher fees through threats
of withholding its repertoire; and (ii) modify certain of ASCAP's other
licensing practices.38 At the same time, in determining to drop its lawsuit
33. An investigation of ASCAP was commenced in 1926, and an antitrust complaint
was filed in 1934. Both were withdrawn shortly thereafter.
34. See United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
United States v. Broadcast Music Inc., 1940-1943 Trade Cases 56,096 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
35. Complaint at 15 (c), United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,104
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
36. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 81-82 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
recognized, in his dissenting opinion in this case where ASCAP had challenged a state statute
making it unlawful for owners of copyrighted music to combine to fix performance license
fees, that blanket licensing arrangements constitute a "flagrant" price-fixing combination by
requiring purchasers "to take, at a monopolistically fixed annual fee, the entire repertory of
all numbers controlled by the combination."
37. CBS Remand, 620 F.2d at 935. As earlier noted, this was echoed by the Department
of Justice when it determined that the blanket license reflects a "significant deviation from
the competitive norm." See supra text accompanying note 11.
38. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cases 56,104 at 11(8). Among other things,
the 1941 Decree enjoined ASCAP from seeking exclusive licenses from its members, and
required it to offer its broadcast users (then radio stations and networks) a licensing alternative
to the blanket license-namely, the per program license granting blanket access to the repertoire




in favor of a consent decree, the Government apparently recognized the
qualified need for the blanket license (at least in the market circumstances
which had prevailed until that time) to accomplish the bona fide concerns
of copyright monitoring and enforcement which had led to the creation of
the performing rights organizations in the first place.
The tension between the anticompetitive tendencies of the blanket license
and the benefits of tolerating it in certain market contexts thus emerged
virtually from the beginning. It was not, however, until ASCAP's relation-
ships with movie theatre operators evolved that the full anticompetitive
potential of the blanket license was realized. The movie theatre setting
presented a circumstance where the blanket license could not be justified
based upon market necessity; its use here had the quite opposite effect of
eliminating a competitive market alternative which could and would have
functioned but for the presence of the blanket license.
IV. THE MoVIE EXHIBITOR EXPERIENCE
The history of ASCAP's license arrangements with theatre operators
has been chronicled in the records of, and court opinions from, repeated
litigations. 9 ASCAP first became involved in licensing theatre owners during
the 1920's, in the era of silent movies. At this stage in the evolution of the
motion picture industry, films were exhibited without soundtracks, and were
typically accompanied by a live piano player or orchestra hired by the
theater owner.40 The selection of musical accompaniment was not pre-
planned and could vary from night to night. The nature of music use thus
was not unlike the spontaneous, unpredictable uses made by taverns, night-
clubs and radio stations of the same era.
ASCAP, on behalf of its members, sought blanket license agreements
with the theatre exhibitors with respect to such performances, and by 1923
it had obtained such licenses. The licenses, covering ASCAP's entire rep-
ertoire, predicated fees upon a theatre's seating capacity. 41
In 1928, "talking" motion pictures were introduced. At first, the sound
(including music) was recorded on phonograph records which could be
played in synchronization with the film. Soon afterward, the soundtrack
technique was developed to record the sound directly on the celluloid on a
separate track, paralleling the picture. This event marked the first instance
of recording music in synchronization with the movie's visual elements.42
The synchronization of music with film fundamentally altered the nature
of music use by theatre exhibitors. The music in "talkies" became pre-
planned and pre-selected by the film's producer and permanently embedded
39. See, e.g., Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), relief,
80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, (findings of fact and
conclusions of law) (S.D.N.Y. 1948) [hereinafter Alden-Rochelle Findings of Fact]; M. Witrmark
& Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1949).
40. See Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 895.
41. Id. at 891-92.
42. Id.
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on the soundtrack of the film. Thus, no longer did an exhibitor make the
kinds of spontaneous and "fleeting" usages of ASCAP music which had
served as justification for the blanket license device in the first place.
Instead, the theatre owner merely exhibited the reel of film as furnished by
the movie company's distributor, with whatever pre-recorded music might
be contained "in the can." The fact that the music in "talkies" was pre-
planned allowed film producers to obtain directly from composers43 licenses
covering the performance of the music in movie theaters at the same time
the producers selected the music and obtained other copyright licenses from
the composers (including the right to record or synchronize the music onto
the film's soundtrack).44
The significant change in the nature and manner of music use by theater
owners eliminated any rationale for blanket licensing in that context. 45
ASCAP, however, did not withdraw voluntarily from licensing theatre
owners on a blanket license basis. ASCAP's members systematically refused
to provide producers the performing rights for a negotiated fee, thus
perpetuating the theatre owners' dependence upon ASCAP blanket licenses.
The technique by which movie and theatre blanket licensing was per-
petuated was both rigid and effective. When dealing with the film producers,
ASCAP's members adopted the uniform practice of granting to the producer
the right to record their musical works as part of the soundtrack of the
films, 46 but specifically withheld from the producer the license to perform
publicly the music in conjunction with the exhibition of the films. 47 The
specific understanding between ASCAP's members and the film producers
was that these public performance rights would be licensed, instead, through
the blanket license arrangements between ASCAP and the theatre exhibitors.
The splitting off of the licensing of music performing rights from the
other music rights granted to the producer contrasted sharply with the
manner in which every other creative right in a film was licensed. Specifi-
cally, in order to assure the theatre owner that he was obtaining all rights
necessary to exhibit a film, the fim producer made it a practice to obtain all
such rights (including other copyright performing rights and non-ASCAP
music performing rights) in direct negotiations "at the source" with each
of the individuals whose acting, writing, directing or other talents comprised
the film. Producer "source" licensing of constituent film elements made
eminent economic sense, since motion pictures were "commercially value-
less" to movie exhibitors without all rights needed to perform them.46
The effect of the ASCAP members' refusal to convey music performing
43. Direct licensing of film producers by songwriters who were not members of ASCAP
was a common practice.
44. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (findings of
fact and conclusions of law 84).
45. See generally Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 888; M. Witmark, 80 F. Supp. at 843.
46. This right is commonly referred to as the synchronization right.
47. See Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 888 (findings of fact and conclusions of law 36,
78).
48. See id. findings of fact and conclusions of law 37, 77, 82, 84.
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rights to the producer was the anomalous exclusion of but one element
from the film package licensed to the exhibitor. While each and every other
creative talent right, including other music rights, was cleared and warranted
by the producer to the exhibitor, performing rights to any ASCAP repertoire
music were excluded. Solely as to those rights, the producers expressly
placed with exhibitors the responsibility for obtaining licensing.
49
One may question why movie producers so readily acquiesced in this
disparate treatment of motion picture theatre performing rights. A signifi-
cant part of the answer lies in what were (and, indeed, remain to this day)
the producers' own intimate ties to ASCAP. °
The ASCAP distribution system provides for equal payments to the
songwriter and publisher of each musical work that earns an ASCAP royalty
distribution."' The predominant music contained in motion pictures is of
the theme and background (or "score") variety written expressly for the
film's producer by a "composer-for-hire." This music written specifically
for movie soundtracks was created and "marketed" independently of tra-
ditional music publishers. The absence of a traditional publisher for
movie music, when combined with ASCAP's distribution system, created a
unique opportunity for the movie producers to, in essence, step into the
shoes of the traditional publisher for purposes of receiving ASCAP royalty
distributions.
The producers-when dealing with requests by ASCAP composers to
withhold the grant of performing rights because of their preference for
licensing through ASCAP-accordingly adopted the following practice: they
permitted the ASCAP composers to withhold these rights, provided that
the right to receive the publisher's share of the ASCAP distributions relating
to performances of the music were transferred to a music publishing
subsidiary of the producer. By this process, the movie producers essentially
received "something for nothing" (i.e., half of every dollar paid out by
ASCAP on account of performances of that music without having to
function in the role of a traditional publisher)., 2 Such a system created an
obvious incentive for the producers to leave the ASCAP blanket license as
applied to movie exhibitors in place.
These circumstances, and ASCAP's demand for large fee increases,
ultimately led the theatre exhibitors in the 1940's to mount the Alden-
Rochelle v. ASCAP and M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen challenges to the
legality of the ASCAP blanket license as it applied to motion picture
exhibitors. The findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by both the
Alden-Rochelle and M. Witmark courts reflect the courts' attempts to
49. See id. findings of fact and conclusions of law 37, 77-78, 82-84.
50. See generally id. findings of fact and conclusions of law 86-89, 95 (discussing history
of movie producers and ASCAP).
51. This method of allocation derives from the time of ASCAP's formation, when
composers virtually always retained the services of a music publisher to publish and exploit
their works, with the composer and publisher sharing in royalty proceeds equally.
52. See Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 888 (findings of fact and conclusions of law 83,
86-89, 95); Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 283 n. 21.
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harmonize the fundamentally competing considerations of the need for a
blanket license in some contexts versus the license's overt anticompetitive
consequences when applied in other settings.
The courts' findings firmly support the central thesis of this article: (i)
that, when applied in contexts in which a user makes spontaneous, unpre-
dictable uses of music, a blanket license permitting rapid and random access
to a performing rights organization's repertoire may be the only way to
balance effectively both the copyright owners' infringement concerns and
users' need for a license; but, (ii) that, where the music being used is
essentially pre-recorded and planned in advance, and where sound economic
principles dictate that in the absence of the blanket license, music copyright
owners would be able effectively to license their works to producers "at
the source," in competitive transactions, the application of the blanket
license is inappropriate.
In this vein, the Alden-Rochelle court emphasized that -it was the
producers' practice to clear all other rights "at the source,"53 including all
music rights not controlled by ASCAP,5 4 and that, but for the existence of
the blanket license,
normal economics would require that performing rights as well as
synchronization rights should be simultaneously acquired by the
producers of the motion pictures, because a motion picture film
production is economically valueless without the right to exhibit
it. 5
The M. Witmark court concurred in this analysis, further noting that
the source licensing of both music synchronization and performing rights
"would provide for a free competitive market in the motion picture industry
for all copyright owners of music suitable for use in sound films." 5 6 As the
Alden-Rochelle court appropriately concluded, consideration of "the good
intentions" underlying the origins of the ASCAP blanket license cannot
justify an elimination of price competition in circumstances where the parties
are effectively insulated from doing business "on a competitive basis in a
free market."
57
The relief afforded in the Alden-Rochelle case against ASCAP and its
members essentially forbade either from licensing performing rights directly
to movie exhibitors. The judgment in that case, among other things,
expressly prohibited ASCAP and its members from withholding the grant
of music performing rights at the time when the music was selected by (and
when synchronization rights to the same music were granted to) the film
producer. It was recognized that the only time a competitive market con-
53. Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 888 (findings of fact and conclusions of law 37,
77).
54. Id. findings of fact and conclusions of law 82, 84.
55. Id. findings of fact and conclusions of law 85.
56. M. Witmark, 80 F. Supp. at 850.
57. Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 895.
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cerning the price and quality of music to be used in a pre-recorded film
could ever exist is at the time the music is selected by the producer from
among competing alternatives." As a consequence of Alden-Rochelle, movie
producers gained the opportunity to negotiate and purchase the music
performing rights at the same time they obtained other required music
copyright licenses such as synchronization rights. This relief was to become
one of the primary features of the 1950 amendment to ASCAP's Consent
Decree.5 9
The immediate post-Alden-Rochelle experience regarding the licensing
of theatrical music performing rights is also particularly instructive. 60 Be-
tween 1951 and 1955, ASCAP offered and entered into blanket license
arrangements directly with the film producers covering the music in each
producer's entire motion picture production schedule, at a fixed fee for
each producer. In 1956, however, ASCAP sought to induce the producers
to pay for their blanket licenses based upon a percentage-of-revenue formula.
The producers uniformly rejected that request, and instead began to explore
a source licensing arrangement for obtaining motion picture theatre per-
forming rights directly from the copyright owners at the same time that
they acquired synchronization rights for the music.
Since 1956, producers uniformly have obtained movie theatre performing
rights through at-the-source, competitive negotiations with music copyright
holders. "Normal economics" has prevailed. 6' As indicated in the following
discussion, however, the benefits of such a free market in music have never
been available to the industry that has evolved to mirror closely the movie
industry in its use of music-local television.
V. EVOLUTION OF THE LocAL TELEVISION BLANKET LICENSE
A. ASCAP's Early Dealings With the Local Television Industry
Television began developing commercially in the early 1940's. In that
era, it was principally a "live" medium.62 Music use was also "live," in
the sense that music was selected and performed "on the spot." In these
58. Once selected and synchronized in the film, of course, there can be no further
competition among musical works.
59. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
60. See Buffalo Broadcasting, 78 Civ. 5670 (S.D.N.Y. Gagliardi, J.): Plaintiffs' Trial
Exhibit 65; deposition testimony of Herman Finkelstein at pp. 142-44, 507-12, 514, 538-43,
547-48, 571-72, 607, 610-15; Amended and Supplemental Stipulation of Facts 115-116 (complete
recitation of the post-Alden-Rochelle experience is found in these portions of the trial record).
61. See Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 888 (findings of fact and conclusions of law 85).
Although the Alden-Rochelle and Witmark litigations challenged only ASCAP's licensing
practices, the result of those decisions has been that the theatrical performing rights of both
BMI's and ASCAP's composer members have been licensed through competitive negotiations
"at the source."
62. See Reply Affidavit of ASCAP's General Counsel, Bernard Korman, submitted in
support of ASCAP's motion for modification of the Amended Final Judgment, United States
v. ASCAP (Civ. 13-95) (WCC), 24 (1984) (wherein Mr. Korman acknowledges that, during
this period, "television was a live medium.")
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early years, in-studio orchestras were a common feature of television pro-
gramming. Thus, it could be said that, at this point in television's evolution,
music use was not unlike that of ASCAP's traditional blanket licensees-
nightclubs, radio stations and the theatre exhibitors during the silent film
era-insofar as the need for access on short notice to a wide range of works
was concerned.
In 1941, ASCAP began issuing blanket licenses to the then-infant
television industry on a "gratuitous" basis. 63 While those licenses were to
last through 1948, as of 1945 ASCAP was already formulating plans which
would enable it to capitalize on television's potential as a source of revenue
to ASCAP's members. 64 By October 1948, ASCAP's efforts to obtain
permission from its members to license television performing rights had
intensified. ASCAP informed its members that fee-bearing television li-
censes would soon be sought for their benefit since "[t]he progress of
commercial television within the past year can only be described in terms
of 'leaps and bounds...' -65 At this time, television programming and its
music content remained predominantly "live, "6 although television networks
and stations increasingly were broadcasting theatrical films after their the-
atrical runs had been completed.
B. ASCAP's Efforts To Circumvent Application of the Principles of
Alden-Rochelle to Its Licensing of Local Television
The entry of the final judgment in Alden-Rochelle67 in November 1948
posed potential devastation for the future of ASCAP's television licensing
activities. While the Alden-Rochelle case had involved an attack upon
ASCAP's blanket licensing practices limited to motion picture theatre ex-
hibitors, Judge Leibell's ruling constituted a sweeping condemnation of
ASCAP's monopoly power and practices, decreeing "[a]lmost every part of
the ASCAP structure" to be in violation of the antitrust laws. 8 Of particular
concern to ASCAP was the reach of the court's judgment, which prohibited
ASCAP and its members from continuing the illegal "splitting" of per-
forming rights from synchronization rights in connection with the exhibition
of motion picture films in theatres or by any other means of exhibition-
including by television broadcast. 69
63. ASCAP issued such licenses as of this time even though its authority to license
television performing rights on behalf of its members was not clear.
64. See Affidavit of ASCAP's General Counsel, Herman Finkelstein, Dec. 26, 1961,
submitted in United States v. ASCAP (Application of Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.),
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) at 4-5, Civ. No. 13-95.
65. Id. at 4-6; Exhibit B.
66. See supra note 62.
67. 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
68. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See supra text
accompanying notes 58-59 (nature of the relief granted).
69. ASCAP's consternation over the impact of the judgment upon its television licensing
activities is reflected in the affidavits of its General Counsel, Herman Finkelstein and Oscar
Hammerstein, then Vice-President of ASCAP, filed in support of ASCAP's motion to stay
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ASCAP immediately sought means of avoiding the impact of the Alden-
Rochelle decision insofar as ASCAP's dealings with the television industry
were concerned. On the heels of the Alden-Rochelle judgment, ASCAP
notified the television industry, on December 1, 1948, that, "in view of the
fact that the television industry ha[s] passed from the experimental to the
commercial stage of its development, the gratuitous licenses would be
terminated effective December 31, 1948. '170 Concerned over the possible
withdrawal of the entire ASCAP repertoire, the television networks agreed,
in October 1949, to the terms of a new blanket license with ASCAP, which
was to set the pattern for all television industry blanket licenses to follow.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Alden-Rochelle judgment, the
ASCAP television license required payment by the television broadcasters
for ASCAP music contained in any motion picture films which might be
exhibited on television, even if the same rights had been cleared at the
source by the producer for theatrical exhibition.71 By compelling broadcasters
to acquire performing rights from ASCAP, this license provision effectively
eliminated any opportunity for television broadcasters to obtain the benefits
of competitively negotiated performing rights in transactions between the
producers of motion pictures and other pre-recorded works and individual
copyright holders, the very relief sought to be afforded in the Alden-
Rochelle and M. Witmark cases.
ASCAP now confronted having the inconsistency between this aspect
of its television license and the relief which Judge Leibell had ordered in
Alden-Rochelle pass muster with the Department of Justice, which was
formulating a major revision of the ASCAP Consent Decree in conformance
with the Alden-Rochelle judgment. Contemporaneous documents reveal a
sharp difference in approach between ASCAP and the Justice Department
on the subject of television. The Department of Justice regarded the "source
licensing" principles of Alden-Rochelle to be equally applicable to the
exhibition of motion pictures and other film, whether exhibited in theatres
or on television. ASCAP, on the other hand, strongly desired strictly to
limit the scope and effect of the Alden-Rochelle decision and judgment to
theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures.
Reflecting the Government's thinking is a 1949 memorandum criticizing
ASCAP's draft decree revisions: "The [relief contemplated by Alden-Ro-
chelle] should not be limited to exhibition of film in a motion picture
theatre since to do so excludes music synchronized in the films used in
telecasting. " 72 Commenting later on its own counter-draft, the Justice De-
the applicability of the Alden-Rochelle judgment to users other than theatre exhibitors.
ASCAP's motion for a stay was subsequently granted. Alden-Rochelle, ASCAP Notice of
Motion and Affidavits in Support of Motion for a Stay of Judgment, Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v.
ASCAP (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1948).
70. Finkelstein Aff., supra note 64, at 6.
71. See 1949 ASCAP-Network Television license at § 5H; Buffalo Broadcasting, supra
note 5 (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 267).
72. May 19, 1949 Department of Justice memorandum from W.D. Kilgore, Jr. to
Sigmund Timberg. See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 565 in Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v.
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partment's draftsmen explained that "it is intended that the new judgment
include television and such modifications as will eliminate the practices
found to be illegal in the Alden-Rochelle case." 73
The Government's rationale was succinctly stated by Sigmund Timberg,
the Chief of its Judgment Enforcement Section, in a June, 1949 memoran-
dum to the head of the Antitrust Division. Echoing Alden-Rochelle and M.
Witmark, Mr. Timberg explained that "[t]he split-up between synchroni-
zation rights and performing rights is a historical accident and has an
artificial legal basis"; that "[tihe transfer of motion picture performing
rights away from ASCAP is consistent with the valid economic preference
for licensing copyrights at the source wherever possible"; and that "[b]lanket
licenses are not necessary in the motion picture industry.
' 74
ASCAP nonetheless pressed the position that any decree amendment
should reflect the holding of Alden-Rochelle in the most narrow fashion
possible. It was ASCAP's fervent desire to limit the applicability of Alden-
Rochelle to ASCAP's dealings with motion picture exhibitors, leaving AS-
CAP free to continue to deal on a blanket license basis with the still-
developing television industry.75
ASCAP ultimately succeeded in its objective. By the time the decree
amendment was finalized, in March of 1950, the source license protections
earlier proposed by the Government for television licensees had been elim-
inated. Instead of providing the television industry with the full benefits of
the Alden-Rochelle decision and judgment, the final decree left ASCAP
fully empowered to license television broadcasters under the very blanket
ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
73. See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 569 in Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546
F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1181 (1985) (August 29, 1949, Department of Justice memorandum from Harold Lasser and
Beatrice Rosenberg to Sigmund Timberg). See also id. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 588).
74. See June 29, 1949 Department of Justice memorandum from Sigmund Timberg to
Herbert A. Bergson (Buffalo Broadcasting, supra, note 5 (Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 566)).
Notably, BMI-today a staunch opponent of source licensing relief for the television industry-
agreed whole-heartedly with these Justice Department views. In a 1949 memorandum submitted
by BMI to the Department of Justice, BMI stated:
BMI believes that the views of both District Courts [Alden-Rochelle and M. Witmark
& Sons] are entirely sound. As found by Judge Leibell, all other licensors, such as
BMI have licensed both synchronization and performing rights in licensing the use
of musical compositions with motion picture film....
The synchronization and performance rights in all motion picture film, whether used
for exhibition in theaters or for television broadcasting, should be treated as suggested
herein. This theory was followed by Judge Leibell who enjoined ASCAP from enforc-
ing its motion picture performance rights against all persons, which would of course
include television broadcasters ...
BMI Memorandum to the Department of Justice on Proposed Modifications of the Consent
Decree in U.S. v. ASCAP, submitted Oct. 25, 1949 at pp. 72-73 (emphasis added) (on file in
the trial record of Buffalo Broadcasting, supra, as Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 153).
75. See Jan. 24, 1949 Department of Justice memorandum from W.D. Kilgore, Jr. to
Files; July 22, 1949 Department of Justice memorandum from Sigmund Timberg to Herbert
A. Bergson; August 29, 1949 Department of Justice memorandum from Harold Lasser and
Beatrice Rosenberg to Sigmund Timberg September 13, 1949 Department of Justice memoran-
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arrangements which the Government's enforcers only months previously had
recognized were an "economic anomaly" without justification.
76
Why did the Government accede to ASCAP's proposal that television
receive different treatment than movie exhibitors? It appears that the Gov-
ernment was persuaded by ASCAP's arguments that: (i) the television
industry was in its infancy and was still developing; (ii) television was, as
of 1950, essentially a live medium and, therefore, was more analogous to
radio than motion pictures; and (ii) as of 1950, very few motion pictures
and other films were being broadcast on television. 77
However cogent these arguments may have been at that time, there can
be no doubt that these factors have no bearing on the television industry
as it operates today. It is indisputable that after 1950, television developed
into virtually an exclusively pre-recorded medium, in which there is scarcely
any "spontaneous" use of music. 7 Old variety shows broadcast live with
studio orchestras have today been replaced with pre-recorded programming
packaged by third parties and shipped to the stations "in the can," in
which the music is pre-selected.
79
In short, in terms of music use, local television broadcasters today have
evolved into "at-home" theatre exhibitors: they simply exhibit reels of
filmed product in which the music is known and was selected by the
producer well in advance of the time of broadcast. In light of the stations'
changed circumstances, it is evident that the blanket license-predicated
upon the need for spontaneous use and random access to the entire ASCAP
and BMI repertoires-has become as much a misfit for television as it had
become for theatre exhibitors by 1950. Yet, as a result of a stroke of the
Government's pen in amending the ASCAP Consent Decree in 1950 and
ASCAP's subsequent consistent refusal to provide Alden-Rochelle-type treat-
ment to television broadcasters after their program and music use patterns
became clear10, the stations remain subject to the same blanket license
structure that existed at the advent of television in the 1940's.
This structure has persisted notwithstanding that the very conditions
which led the Alden-Rochelle court to disallow ASCAP's blanket licensing
dum from Sigmund Timberg to Harold Lasser and Beatrice Rosenberg (on file in the trial record of
Buffalo Broadcasting, supra note 72, as Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 557, 567, 569 and 571,
respectively).
76. Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP
Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAw " D CoNTEMoRARY PROBLEMS 294, 301-302 (1954).
77. See Buffalo Broadcasting, Deposition Testimony of Sigmund Timberg (March 13,
1981) at pp. 63-68, 71-74, 178-79, 232-33; Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits 586-87 (including transcript
of proceedings in U.S. v. ASCAP dated March 14, 1950); see also Affidavit of ASCAP
General Counsel Bernard Korman, supra note 62, acknowledging that "[i]n March 1950, when
the Amended Final Judgment was entered, . . . television was a live medium.... In 1950, no
one even dreamed that television would ever become a medium depending almost entirely on
pre-recorded film or taped programming."
78. See supra note 77, Buffalo Broadcasting trial transcript, Buffalo Broadcasting, supra
note 60 at 65, 81; Affidavit of Howard P. Kitt at 34, 45, 225-231, sworn to November 11,
79. See Amended and Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Buffalo Broadcasting, supra
note 60 at 65, 81; Affidavit of Howard P. Kitt at §§ 34, 45, 225-231, sworn to November 11,
1981, submitted as expert testimony in Buffalo Broadcasting, supra note 60.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
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of the theatre operators in the 1940's have come to characterize ASCAP's
and BMI's licensing of television stations-to wit: (i) the continued absence
of any price competition among the copyright holders whose works are
contained in the pre-recorded product broadcast by television stations; (ii)
the continued uniform and anomalous practice of ASCAP and BMI mem-
bers to withhold the licensing of television performing rights to film prod-
ucers, pursuant to arrangements whereby the composers and producers agree
to license the television performing rights through ASCAP" or BMI and
further agree to share in the royalties paid by those organizations by virtue
of the grant of the "publisher" royalty share to producer-affiliated com-
panies;8 ' and (iii) the conceded recognition that, absent the blanket license,
"normal economics" dictate that performing rights would be licensed in
competitive negotiations at the source.
82
C. The Local Television Broadcasters' Unsuccessful Efforts to Obtain
Source Licensing
The history reveals that the non-application of Alden-Rochelle principles
to television was the product of ASCAP's determination to limit source
licensing to the realm of theatrical exhibition, at a time when television
arguably was developing as a different type of music user than motion
picture theatres. ASCAP persists in using this early victory to resist the
development of television source licensing-notwithstanding the fundamental
changes which have occurred in television programming and music use. For
example, when in 1958 the Government, in apparent recognition of the
development of television into a pre-recorded medium, inquired of ASCAP
as to the rationale for excluding television from the benefits of source
licensing, ASCAP, through its counsel, responded by claiming that the
"problem was considered and disposed of" (evidently forever, in ASCAP's
view) in the negotiations leading to the 1950 Decree.83
ASCAP's (and later BMI's) tenacity in seeking to avoid development
of a television source licensing market is also reflected in its post-1950
license history with the local television industry. Local television broadcasters
have repeatedly attempted to obtain source licensing for television through
81. This practice applies even to the music in a movie that appears on television after its
theatrical run, for which the composer-since the Alden-Rochelle era-has granted the theatrical
performing rights in the same music to the producer in competitive source licensing transactions.
82. ASCAP in its Trial Memorandum in Buffalo Broadcasting noted: "Obviously, in a
world where telecasters did not have blanket licenses, producers and publishers would have
every incentive to negotiate over performing rights-and there is no reason to believe they
would not do so." Trial Memorandum of Defendants ASCAP, et al., Buffalo Braodcasting,
supra note 60, dated November 13, 1981, at p. 53.
83. Letter from ASCAP outside counsel, Arthur Dean, to Robert A. Bicks, dated
September 17, 1958, Buffalo Broadcasting, supra note 60, (Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 326), at 9.
See also September 10, 1959 Department of Justice Memorandum from John Wilson to Files
(Buffalo Broadcasting trial record, Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 325) ("Finkelstein says this problem
[i.e., ASCAP's right to license television performing rights to music in motion picture films
and other pre-recorded programming] was argued out in 1950 ... ").
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negotiations with ASCAP and BMI,84 through intervention of the ASCAP
judicial rate court,8 5 through efforts to obtain antitrust relief, 6 and, most
recently, through the introduction of copyright reform legislation.
87
Local television broadcasters began their efforts to obtain source li-
censing in 1949, during the very first round of negotiations with ASCAP
over a fee-bearing license. Through a committee representing the local (as
opposed to network) television industry,88 the local stations-which in 1949
were broadcasting movies and other pre-recorded films to a far greater
extent than television networks-pressed vigorously for a license that would
have accorded stations the benefit of the Alden-Rochelle decision for films
aired on television. Notwithstanding the similar nature of television stations
and motion picture theatres with respect to the exhibition of films (both
receive the product "in the can" well after the point in time when any
competition over music performing rights licensing can take place), ASCAP
"would have none of it" and rejected the stations' clearance-at-source
proposals."9
After expiration of the first series of ASCAP blanket licenses at the
end of the 1950's, the local broadcasters again attempted to achieve source
licensing relief at the bargaining table. By this time, pre-recorded television
programming dominated the airwaves. The stations accordingly sought to
negotiate with ASCAP a new form of license which would exclude syndi-
cated, pre-recorded movies and other filmed product from the coverage of
the blanket license in order to allow for the development of source licensing
for such product. ASCAP refused to entertain the proposal. The local
broadcasters thereafter commenced a proceeding under the ASCAP Consent
84. See United States v. ASCAP, Application of Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.,
208 F.Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd 331 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 997 (1964) [hereinafter Shenandoah]; Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 288.
85. The rate court was created under the 1950 Consent Decree as a hoped-for check on
ASCAP's monopoly pricing power. It is charged with setting a "reasonable" license fee upon
application by any ASCAP licensee.
86. See Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F.Supp. at 288.
87. See supra note 20. The respective House and Senate bills would effectively require
music copyright holders to convey music performing rights licenses applicable to copyrighted
music contained in syndicated programming to the producer of such programming.
88. Initially, all television broadcasters, networks and local stations alike, were represented
in license negotiations by the Music Committee of the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB). After negotiations between ASCAP and the overall NAB Committee broke down in
early May of 1949, ASCAP initiated negotiations solely with the networks, until a network
blanket license agreement was reached in the Summer of 1949. The local stations, finding the
network arrangement unacceptable, formed their own committee and resumed negotiations
with ASCAP concerning local station licenses in September of 1949. See Amended Supplemental
Stipulation of Facts, Buffalo Broadcasting, supra note 60 at 142-143.
89. See Buffalo Broadcasting trial record, deposition testimony of Robert Myers at p.
64. This occurred at the same time that ASCAP was successfully urging the Justice Department
to back down from the Government's initial position (which, unbeknownst to the local
broadcasters, was on all fours with the broadcasters' position at the bargaining table) that the
clearance-at-source principles of Alden-Rochelle should be applied to films exhibited on
television.
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Decree seeking an order directing ASCAP to issue the requested new form
of license.9 That request ultimately was denied by the Court which-without
passing on the bonafides of the stations' request or the competitive concerns
involved-simply concluded that it was without power under the Consent
Decree to order ASCAP to issue the specific form of license requested. 9'
The stations' unsuccessful source licensing foray in the Shenandoah
proceeding ended in the execution of another decade-long license agreement,
which expired in 1977. At that time the stations again sought source licensing
relief, by means of an antitrust attack focused upon the competition-
eliminating effect of the blanket license as applied to the stations' syndicated
film portion of their program day. 92
By the time the stations had their day in court in the antitrust proceed-
ing, in the Fall of 1981, the state of antitrust doctrine regarding ASCAP's
and BMI's blanket licensing arrangements had taken a curious turn. In its
decision in Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court had determined, in the context of a
television network challenge to the blanket license, that the antitrust legality
of the blanket license was to be tested under the rule of reason, in light of
the individual market circumstances presented by particular users.93 Upon
remand to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for a rule of reason
determination on the network facts, the Court of Appeals determined that,
while a rule of reason determination ordinarily "requires a determination
of whether an agreement is on balance an unreasonable restraint of trade,
that is, whether its anticompetitive effects outweigh its pro-competitive
effects," 94 such inquiry might be avoided altogether if, as a "threshold"
90. See Shenandoah, supra note 84, at 120.
91. Id. at 122-24. Given the prior acquiescence of the Justice Department in 1950 to
ASCAP's pleas that television not be given the benefits of source licensing, the conclusion
reached by the court is not surprising. One would not readily assume that a court would
accomplish by indirection (i.e., expansive interpretation of a consent decree) that which the
Government in 1950 affirmatively declined to accomplish directly.
92. Buffalo Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
93. 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979). Notably, the Supreme Court in BMI v. CBS found that
since the blanket license "allows the licensee immediate use of covered compositions, without
the delay of prior individual negotiations," id.at 22, there were some circumstances where,
absent the blanket license, "the commerce anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected
against restraint by the Sherman Act would not exist at all .... " Id. at 19. The Court made
clear its reference here to the "milieu" of "individual radio stations, nightclubs, and restau-
rants," id. at 20, where " '[t]he disk-jockey's itchy fingers and the bandleader's restive
baton' " precluded as a practical matter the negotiation of music rights "well in advance of
the time of performance."- Id. at 22 n. 37. The Court at the same time contrasted those
instances from the situations in which music rights could be individually and directly negotiated
in advance-"dramatic rights... [and] other rights, such as sheet music, recording, and
synchronization"-where there would be little, if any, justification for a blanket license. Id.
The Court concluded from such analysis that, "when attacked, [the blanket license] should be
subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason." Id. at 24.
94. CBS Remand, 620 F.2d at 934.
1176
BLANKET MUSIC LICENSING
matter, it can be shown that the "complaining customer elects to use [the
blanket license] in preference to realistically available marketing alterna-
tives." 9s The Court of Appeals proceeded to dismiss CBS's lawsuit on the
grounds that it had long used the blanket license and had failed to prove
the absence of such "fully available" alternatives.
This unprecedented departure from a traditional rule of reason exami-
nation of challenged marketing practices was sharply attacked by the Gov-
ernment as analytically incorrect;96 however, the ruling not only stood, but
became the governing legal standard for the local television stations' own
case.
At trial, the local television stations succeeded, even under the Court
of Appeals' demanding test, in demonstrating that the blanket license, as
applied to their pre-recorded program day, violated the Sherman Act by
foreclosing a competitive, source licensing marketY7 The Court of Appeals
reversed, essentially on the grounds that the stations had not satisfactorily
proved the absence of "fully available" alternatives to the blanket license-
thus obviating the necessity of evaluating the possible anticompetitive effects
of the blanket license.98
Whatever may be said about the correctness of the mode of legal
analysis which now governs antitrust challenges to the ASCAP and BMI
licenses, it is this observer's view that the very history which, since the
1940's, has remitted the stations to blanket licensing, also contributed
strongly to the stations' undoing in the antitrust litigation. As noted, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Buffalo Broadcasting case
put the burden on the stations to prove that they could not fight their way
out of the blanket license. The Court seemingly adopted the view that, if
the broadcasters had been serious all of these years about achieving source
licensing, such alternative would have been readily obtainable. The very fact
that the broadcasters have been operating under a blanket license for many
years served, for the Court, as evidence of the stations' apparent preference
for it. The Court reached this conclusion in the face of the trial testimony
of a series of broadcasting executives and extensive documentation indicating
the enormous difficulties encountered in the effort to obtain source licensing.
The Court's conclusion in reliance on history also flies in the face of the
record of persistent and costly efforts on the part of the broadcasters to
95. Id. at 935.
96. Upon CBS's petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General, asked by the Supreme
Court for his views, expressed the Government's sharp disagreement with the truncated analysis
embraced by the Court of Appeals. The Government brief noted: "[I]t does not necessarily
follow that the existence of economic alternatives demonstrates that the respondents' licensing
scheme has no anticompetitive effect." The Solicitor General cautioned that, "if the court of
appeals intended to establish a rule of general applicability on this point, its decision would
be clearly wrong and appropriately subject to summary reversal." Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 7-8, CBS v. ASCAP, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (No. 80-323).
97. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 291-93, 296.
98. Buffalo Broadcasting, 744 F.2d at 933.
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achieve fundamental licensing relief. Why would costly litigative and legis-
lative efforts be undertaken if source licensing were available simply for the
asking?
VI. THE NEED FOR A LEGIsLATV E SOLUTION
Television broadcasters are, analytically, no different than movie theatre
exhibitors in their use of copyrighted music on filmed product. As was
demonstrated to be the case with motion picture exhibitors, a blanket license
is no longer necessary in the context of local television "to make the market
function." 99 Yet, the Government's hesitancy in 1950, the subsequent en-
trenchment of the blanket license system, and the sui generis treatment
which the courts have afforded ASCAP and BMI have brought about an
inversion of the antitrust analytical process. The burden has been placed
on the broadcasters to justify their entitlement to the benefits of a com-
petitive market. A presumption has been made in favor of monopoly over
competition, of regulation through a rate court over free market price
determinations, contrary to the purpose of the copyright and antitrust laws.
Why should not the burded of justification for a licensing system which
departs from these norms be placed upon the beneficiaries of that system?
The ability of the local television broadcasters to initiate a so-called
"rate court" proceeding under Article IX of the 1950 ASCAP Consent
Decree (although not under BMI's 1966 Decree) serves as no solution to
the broadcasters' present predicament. The limited scope of such a pro-
ceeding is to establish "reasonable" license fee levels, i.e., to make a guess
as to the value of the music required by the broadcasters, under a continued
regime of blanket licensing. The rate court thus not only perpetuates the
current licensing structure, it also represents a costly, cumbersome and
artificial substitute for a free market determination of the value of music
through a source licensing system.
In practice, moreover, the rate court has proven to be ineffective. The
ASCAP Consent Decree prescribes no guidelines for determining what
constitutes a "reasonable" fee, and in thirty-six years the court has provided
none. Proceedings have traditionally devolved into wide-ranging discovery
expeditions focusing less upon issues of music use and value than upon
users' ability to pay. It is not surprising, given the foregoing, that the rate
court has never adjudicated a case to conclusion. Such a flawed judicial
mechanism can hardly be said to provide a meaningful avenue for local
television broadcasters to achieve their legitimate licensing objectives.
Television stations are trapped by their history. They are being penalized
for having lived with a system they did not want from the outset and from
which they have struggled to escape.
99. See BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 23; Broadcast Music Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527
F.Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981), aff'd mem, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982) (antitrust challenge to
blanket licensing of small establishments offering live music dismissed upon finding that blanket
license was necessary and that there were no feasible alternatives in that market).
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When changes in society and technological innovation alter the market
for copyrighted materials, our courts have consistently looked to Congress
to amend, as necessary, copyright law and policy. 00 Indeed Congress, itself,
has explicitly acknowledged that changes in the technologies of motion
pictures, sound recordings, radio and television may engender imbalances
which require correction.'0 '
It is appropriate, therefore, for Congress to correct the "historical
accident"' 0 2 which has resulted in the anomalous licensing practice which
prevails for television music. Such relief would be wholly consistent with
what the architect of the ASCAP Consent Decree alluded to as "the valid
economic preference for licensing copyrights at the source wherever possi-
ble."' 03 In today's world of pre-recorded television, it is not only possible
to have copyrighted music so licensed, but effective copyright and antitrust
policy would seem to require it.
100. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984).
101. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. at 47 (1976) (noting that technical
advances within these mediums frequently cause "the business relations between authors and
users.. . [to] evolve new patterns").
102. See supra note 74 (Dept. of Justice Memorandum from Sigmund Timberg to Herbert
A. Bergson),
103. Id.
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